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Abstract This paper empirically investigates the granular level risk of education loan using a
cross section of data from 5000 borrowers obtained from four major public sector banks in India.
The ﬁndings suggest that education loan defaults are mainly inﬂuenced by security, borrower
margin, and repayment periods. The presence of guarantor or co-borrower and collateral sig-
niﬁcantly reduce default loss rates. The socioeconomic characteristics of borrowers and their
regional locations also act as important factors associatedwith education loan defaults. The results
suggest that by segmenting borrowers by probability of default and loss given default in a mul-
tidimensional scale, banks can adopt better risk mitigation and pricing strategies to resolve bor-
rower problems.
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Introduction
Bank credit has an important role in promoting the educa-
tion and development of skilled professionals required by an
emerging market economy such as India. Banks in India provide
education loans in the form of term loans. The loans are meant
for funding diploma, graduation, and medical (MBBS) studies,
post-graduation including technical (Engineering, Com-
puter Science, etc.) and professional courses (Master of Busi-
ness Administration or MBA, Hotel Management, Aviation, etc.)
offered in India and abroad and recognised by the university/
government/autonomous institutions such as the Indian In-
stitutes of Technology (IITs) and the Indian Institutes of
Management (IIMs). The traditional education loan scheme
can provide ﬁnancial assistance of Rs 1 million for pursuing
higher education in India. Similarly, an applicant can get up
to Rs 2 million for studies abroad. The interest rate is around
13%, depending upon the amount of the loan. A concession
is provided to girl students and also to economically poor stu-
dents through a central government subsidy scheme. There
are no processing fees. Repayment commences one year after
completion of the course or six months after securing a job,
whichever is earlier. Thematurity period of the loan for studies
in India (up to Rs 1 million) and studies abroad (Rs 2 million)
is 5–7 years. Generally, no security is required for loans up
to Rs 400 000. But for loan amounts ranging from Rs 400 000
to Rs 750 000, banks may seek third party guarantee. For loans
above Rs 750 000, tangible collateral security of suitable value,
along with the assignment of the future income of the student
for payment of instalments, is required. The loans for voca-
tional courses are unsecured loans generally in the range of
Rs 20 000 to Rs 150 000 for those pursuing courses that have
a tenure ranging from 2 to 3 months to 3 years. The mora-
torium period ranges from six months to one year.
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The level of credit risk in education loans has been very
high in India in recent years. The system level gross non-
performing assets for education loans is around 6% in com-
parison to 2.6% for its overall retail portfolio during the year
2012–2013. As a result, there has been a sharp decline in the
growth rate of education loans in scheduled commercial banks
(SCBs) in recent years. Banks are also seeking credit guaran-
tee protection from the government.
The major causes of default of loans are:
Idiosyncratic borrower speciﬁc problems: The borrower spe-
ciﬁc risk arises due to reasons such as repayment problem,
collateral risk, academic failure, drop out, personal prob-
lems, ﬁnancial problems (hence lesser capacity to pay),
and so on. The rise in the number of institutions also in-
creases employability risk due to an increase in the supply
of students. Institutional characteristics or reputation and
course category can also determine the employment
opportunity.
Systematic (market speciﬁc/external) factors: Loan de-
faults could also occur when students do not get
employment/placements due to external risk. Following
a ﬁnancial crisis or a recession, companies may hire fewer
employees. Further, lack of quality education that can
ensure jobs is also another reason for higher default.
Further, wrong selection of beneﬁciaries, ineffective follow
up of advances, and failure of debt collection machinery in
banks have also contributed to non-performing assets (NPAs)
in education loans.
Under the Basel II internal rating based approach (IRB)
for measuring regulatory credit risk capital, education loans
fall into the category of “other retail exposures”. The prob-
ability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) are the
most important drivers of credit risk. Though there are nu-
merous studies and publications on retail credit scoring, very
few studies have been conducted in an emerging market
economy like India to assess education loan default risk by
applying econometric models. Boyes, Hoffman, and Low (1989)
demonstrate how maximum likelihood estimates of default
probabilities can be obtained using the data on borrower spe-
ciﬁc personal characteristics, economic variables and ﬁnan-
cial variables from credit card applicants. Altman, Avery,
Eisenbeis, and Sinkey (1981) have reviewed the literature
on application of statistical techniques in the development
of retail score cards. Greene (1992) developed a statistical
scoring model for discrete choice and explained its utility in
predicting consumer loan default and loan approvals. Fritz,
Luxenburger, and Miehe (2007) describe the retail score card
development process through a linear combination of several
input variables such as socio-demographic information, bor-
rower ﬁnancial information, account data, collateral char-
acteristics, and external credit history data. Such scoring
models are able to predict the future default and survival
probability of a customer and thereby could assist in the
lending process. Roszbach (2004) developed a bivariate Tobit
model to predict future defaults and loan survival time for
new retail applicants. Such models allow banks to better
predict the risk of a customer and make more realistic evalu-
ations of the returns.
Flint (1997), Knapp and Seaks (1992), Volkwein and Szelest
(1995), andWoo (2002) examined the role of individual student
background and institution characteristics in predicting student
loan default. Gross, Cekic, Hossler, and Hillman (2009) con-
ducted a survey of studies of student loan default. They have
summarised several multivariate empirical studies of student
loan default conducted between 1991 and 2007 to investi-
gate crucial factors of student loan default. These factors have
been categorised under: a) students characteristics; b) in-
stitution category (type, area, educational outcomes etc.);
c) level of student debt; and d) students’ employment and
income and total debt position. Lochner, Stinebrickner, and
Suleymanoglu (2013) have used survey and administrative data
from the Canadian Student Loan Programme and have con-
sidered demographic characteristics (age, gender, and ab-
original status), educational background, income and other
ﬁnancial resources in their study. They ﬁnd that income level,
access to savings and family support, educational attain-
ment, and various demographic factors have inﬂuence on
student loan repayment behaviour. The ﬁndings from these
studies have guided us in our study in the framing of the hy-
potheses, the methodology, and the choice of variables.
In this paper, we have studied the micro level risk of edu-
cation loan using a large set of historical customer level loan
data sample from four major public sector banks in India. Our
main objective is to study the performance of loans over time
and identify key risk factors of such loans across various ge-
ographies and constitutions. Accordingly, we have col-
lected data of performing as well as defaulted accounts to
compare their behaviours and identify key risk factors. We
have examined education loan default as explained by various
characteristics associated with the loan (loan amount, in-
terest rate and repayment period), and security positions
(margin given, security, etc.). For this, we have employed
multivariate statistical techniques to control multiple factors
that contribute to default risk. We also check how various bor-
rower characteristics (age, marital status, presence of
guarantor/co-borrower, etc.), geographic locations of bor-
rowers (rural, semi-urban, urban, and metro), course related
factors (domestic vs. overseas education and placement
record) and rating of the education institutes explain risk of
default in student loans.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, we describe the empirical methodology that has been
adopted in this paper. The third section lays out the data,
construction of variables, and descriptive statistics. The fourth
section presents the empirical results. This section dis-
cusses the key ﬁndings of our study and their relevance. The
ﬁfth section discusses the main conclusions of the paper.
Empirical methodology
In order to understand the borrower risk pattern, we have
performed univariate tests such as mean comparison t test
and rank sum test on some key target variables (default in-
cidents, default losses, etc.) and across various sub-categories
(e.g. rural vs. urban customers, domestic vs. overseas courses
and secured vs. unsecured loans). We have also tested pair-
wise correlation between various test variables (e.g. corre-
lation between loan amount, margin paid, co-borrower
income, course type and placement records with incidents
of default).
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Multivariate analysis—logistic regression estimation
for predicting default risk
We have used logistic regression technique to examine how
various borrower speciﬁc aswell as loan speciﬁc factors (quali-
tative as well quantitative) along with situational factors (lo-
cation and local factors) inﬂuence the probability of a loan
default.
Logistic regression is a useful tool for analysing data that
include binary dependent variables like default and non-
default status of an account (coding of NPA vs. not NPA into
1, 0 mode). Logistic regression is non-linear transformation
of the linear regression model that determines the probabil-
ity that the borrower will default because of other caus-
ative factors such as absence of security, margin, lack of
placement, and so on. However, unlike ordinary least square
(OLS), it does not require assumptions about normality. The
dependent variable is log odds ratio Default (D) over Non-
Default (ND) or logit. Note that Prob (D) + Prob (ND) = 1.
The probability of the outcome is measured by the odds
of occurrence of an event. If the symbol “P” is the probabil-
ity of a default event, then (1-P) is the probability of it not
occurring.
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Through regression exercise, we try to ﬁnd estimates for
βk parameters so that the logistic function best ﬁts the
data.
Logistic regression technique is appropriate for estimat-
ing the log of the odds of default as a linear function for loan
attributes. The risk factors and logic for selection of vari-
ables are summarised in Table 1.
Logistic regression uses maximum-likelihood estimation to
compute the coefﬁcients for the logistic regression equa-
tion. The maximum likelihood (MLE) function that has been
optimised with respect to the parameters is deﬁned as:
L l y P x y P xi i i i
i
n
β β( ) = ( )[ ] = ( )[ ] + −( ) − ( )[ ]{ }
=
∑ln ln ln1 1
1
(3)
The likelihood function is an equation for the joint prob-
ability of the observed events as a function of β.
The model likelihood ratio (LR) statistic is:
LR i LL of beginning model
LL of ending model
[ ] ( )[ ]
− ( )[ ]}
= −
−
2
2
(4)
The LR statistic is distributed chi-square with k degrees
of freedom, where k is the number of independent vari-
ables. The pseudo R2 or McFadden’s R2 measures the degree
of ﬁtness of the model.1
Multivariate analysis—Tobit regression estimation
to predict LGD
We have used Tobit censored regression technique to examine
the determinants of education loan LGD in a multivariate
analysis framework. The dependent variable is LGD which is
loss given default = 1-historical recovery rate (RR). The his-
torical RR is the sum of the cash ﬂow received from de-
faulted loans divided by total loan amount due at the time
of default (EAD). The construction of the variable has been
explained in Table 1. The hypotheses have been built based
on the literature discussed in the previous section.
Since many loans have zero loss rates, we have censored
the dependent variable LGD (at zero level). A Tobit regres-
sion performs maximum likelihood technique (MLE) and gives
us unbiased estimates of coefﬁcients as compared to OLS tech-
nique (Amemiya, 1981; Greene, 1997; Maddala, 1983).
In modelling the LGD rate of a defaulted loan, the Tobit
censored regression model (censored from below) is a better
suited model as it takes into account bounds on the depen-
dent variable through truncation. It uses a latent variable y*
to model boundary cases such that:
y xi i i* .= +β ε (5)
Yi = y* if y* > 0 & yi = 0 if y* ≤ 0 where the error term
ε σi IN~ ,0 2( ) .
Thus, yi = max (0, y*) for left side censoring. Note that this
method does not drop “0” observations because “0” LGD
values are also important in the predictive equation.
The likelihood function for the Tobit model can be written
as:
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When the likelihood function (mentioned above) has been
maximised (MLE method) with respect to β and σ, we get the
estimates of the regression parameters (Maddala, 1989;
Greene, 1997, pp. 962–966; Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 517–520).
Data, variables and summary statistics
We created a data template to collect borrower level edu-
cation loan data from 10 participating banks. We selected such
1 Pseudo R2 or McFadden’s R
LL
LL
M2
0
1= − , where LLM is maximum like-
lihood and LLₒ is the initial likelihood ratio.
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Table 1 Description of variables used in the study and hypotheses.
Variable Full form and deﬁnition Argumentation/Logic for selection of variable
DDEF Default Dummy; DDEF = 1 if account is NPA and DDEF = 0 if it is in
standard category
The higher the odd, i.e., Prob(DDEF = 1/DDEF = 0), the higher is the
chance of default
LGD Loss Given Default
Recoveries
EAD
= −
∑1
Recoveries = Total post-default principal and interest recovery;
Exposure of default (EAD) = Principal outstanding + Interest due at
default year
The higher the LGD, the higher is the severity of losses due to
borrower default
LOANSIZE Represents the loan size; it is measured either by taking natural log of
loan outstanding or loan limit
Loan size has inﬂuence on the default risk
GENDERD Dummy variable capturing gender information. GENDERD = 1 if the
borrower is male & GENDERD = 0 if the borrower is female
This captures borrower character which may explain default
behaviour
MARRITALD Dummy capturing marital status. Dummy = 1, if borrower is married;
= 0 if unmarried
Socioeconomic factors inﬂuence default risk; older students may
have higher ﬁnancial obligations
LNAGE Natural log of age capturing the age of the borrower Capturing borrower speciﬁc character that might have inﬂuence on
default
Borrower margin (BMARGIN) Captures borrower’s own contribution in ﬁnancing course expenses. It
is estimated as follows: BMARGIN
Limit Sanctioned
Course Expenses
= −1
The higher the borrower margin, the lower is the probability of
default
REPAYMNTH Repayment period of the loan in number of months Tenure of the loan explains the default risk of the loan
SECURITYD Dummy variable capturing whether loan is secured (=1) or un-secured
(=0)
Presence of collateral security has risk reduction effect
Presence of guarantee
(GUARDUM)
Dummy = 1 if guarantee/co-borrower is attached to the loan,
Dummy = 0 if there is no guarantee
Presence of guarantee reduces the default risk as well as loss given
default
LNEAD Log of EAD measures the size of outstanding at default The greater the default outstanding amount, the higher is the
severity of loss
BORRLOCD1_R,
BORRLOCD2_SU,
BORRLOCD3_U &
BORRLOCD4_M
Four location dummies (1, 0 form) representing borrower location in
rural, semi-urban, urban and metro areas. These dummies capture
the local situational factors.
Local factors have inﬂuence on probability of default of a borrower
INDLOCD1_C, INDLOCD2_N,
INDLOCD3_E, INDLOCD4_NE,
INDLOCD5_W, INDLOCD6_S &
INDLOCD7_UT
Seven region dummies (1,0 form) capturing borrower location in
different parts of India: Central, North, East, North East, West,
South and in Union Territories (UTs)
Regional location factors have inﬂuence on likelihood of default
COURSE_CATD1-
COURSE_CATD10
Ten course type dummies (1, 0 form) to capture course differences. Employability and job market success of the courses matter in
predicting default of a borrower
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banks that had signiﬁcant exposure to education loan schemes
so that data obtained from them were robust and represen-
tative of the entire population of such schemes. Amongst these
10 banks that we approached, 6 banks provided us with de-
tailed borrower level data. Finally, we selected four banks
from which to draw our sample data as the information given
by them was as per our requirements. Amongst them, three
are large banks and one is a mid-sized bank. The total busi-
ness of these banks covers almost 50% of the entire educa-
tion loan advances in India. These four banks provided us with
detailed account level data with the borrower code and char-
acteristics of each applicant (age, gender, education, etc.),
the date on which the loan was sanctioned, the loan limit,
size of the disbursement, interest rate, tenure, margin given,
course information (domestic or overseas), course expenses,
placement record (not in all cases), institution rating (record
not available in many cases), information about guarantor or
co-borrower, the status of each loan (good or bad), post-
defaulted recoveries of defaulted loans, and so on.
The sample data of 5000 borrowers are randomly drawn
from the loan information data given by these four banks. All
these banks have education loan schemes for both higher edu-
cation and vocational/skill development education and train-
ing courses. These banks have signiﬁcant exposure to
education loan schemes and hence the data obtained from
them are robust and representative of the entire popula-
tion of such schemes in India.
Table 1 gives a brief description of the variables used in
our micro risk analysis along with an argumentation for the
choice of each variable. Table 2 provides a brief descrip-
tion of the sample data used in the study. It gives the proﬁle
of the education loan borrowers and their distribution in India.
Table 2 shows that 12.17% of the borrowers are default bor-
rowers in the sample data. The average size of the loan limit
is Rs 340 000 (approximately) and outstanding is Rs 265 000
with a median size of Rs 186 000.
The median age of the borrowers is 24 years with a stan-
dard deviation of 12 years. Location wise, 42.99% of the sample
borrowers live in urban India, 22.16% in metros, 18.62% in rural
areas and the remaining 16.23% in semi-urban areas. As far
as regional distribution of borrowers is concerned, 57.605%
of education loan borrowers are concentrated in the south-
ern part of India (in the states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh,
Kerala, and Karnataka) followed by 16.25% in the north, 11.53%
in the west and 10% in the east. We have also seen that the
default contributions are higher from urban and rural areas.
Our sample data are quite representative of the actual ag-
gregate population distribution of education loans in India.
Furthermore, we have classiﬁed the education courses into
10 different categories (e.g., 1: Teaching; 2: Engineering &
B tech; 3: Medical,…, and 10: Nursing courses as in Table 3).
Most of the education loans are for Engineering (BE and B Tech)
courses (51.6%), followed by Master of Business Administra-
tion (MBA) and Management courses (14%), other technical
and professional courses (8.03%), University post-graduate
courses (7.67%) and Teaching courses (5.70%). We have further
examined whether course category explains the loan default
risk. Table 3 gives additional statistics about course-wise
default rates (default proportions). The default rates are
highest in Teaching and Training courses (course category 1:
Table 2 Overall sample descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Median Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Loan limit (Rs Lac) 4998 0.3399 0.240 0.3786 0.008 2.30
Loan outstanding (Rs Lac) 4957 0.2654 0.186 0.2947 0.0018 2.702
LNEAD 470 −0.3332 −0.3377 0.991 −4.573 2.5455
DDEF 5000 0.1217 0.00 0.327 0 1
GENDERD (=1, Male; =0, Female) 4918 0.662 1 0.473 0 1
MARRITALD (=1, Married; =0, Other) 4584 0.1555 0 0.3624 0 1
AGE 4875 28 24 12 17 64
LNAGE 4875 3.26 3.18 3.27 2.83 4.16
Repayment months (REPAYMNTH) 4961 107 111 26 12 250
BMARGIN 683 0.2190 0.1483 0.8407 0 0.80
SECURITYD (=1, Secured; =0, not) 4946 0.115 0 0.32 0 1
GUARDUM (=1, with guarantee; 0, not) 2619 0.2146 0 0.41 0 1
BORRLOCD1_R 4941 0.1862 0 0.39 0 1
BORRLOCD2_SU 4941 0.1623 0 0.37 0 1
BORRLOCD3_U 4941 0.4299 0 0.43 0 1
BORRLOCD4_M 4941 0.2216 0 0.49 0 1
INDLOCD1_C 5000 0.027 0 0.163 0 1
INDLOCD2_N 5000 0.1625 0 0.369 0 1
INDLOCD3_E 5000 0.10 0 0.30 0 1
INDLOCD4_NE 5000 0.0168 0 0.1285 0 1
INDLOCD5_W 5000 0.1153 0 0.3195 0 1
INDLOCD6_S 5000 0.57605 1 0.4942 0 1
INDLOCD7_UT 5000 0.0018 0 0.0423 0 1
Units in Rs million, others in numbers.
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49.11%). This number is statistically signiﬁcant when com-
pared to other courses. This has been conﬁrmed by an un-
paired univariate t-test (mean difference 0.389 with t = 17.85).
The other high default rates are observed in Diploma courses
(course category 7, default rates: 25.37%) and in University
post-graduate courses (course category 6, default rates:
18.42%). Defaults are relatively lower in Engineering (course
category 2: 7.97%) and Medical courses (course category 3:
7.93%). There are no defaults in Law and professional Char-
tered Accountancy courses (category 9). This probably cap-
tures the employability and job market success of the courses
in explaining education loan defaults.
Table 4 compares the proﬁle of defaulted and non-
defaulted (solvent) borrowers in our sample data of educa-
tion loans. There is a statistically signiﬁcant difference
between the two classes of customers. Solvent groups are dis-
tinctly safer than their defaulted counterparts. One can notice
that average loan size is signiﬁcantly higher in the solvent
group than their defaulted counterparts. The proportion of
female (61.56%) and married (36.21%) borrowers is rela-
tively higher in the defaulted group than the solvent group
of borrowers. On the other hand, the average borrower margin
is signiﬁcantly higher in case of the solvent group of borrow-
ers (19.01%) in comparison to the defaulted ones (11.52%).
Table 5 describes the interest rates on various sizes of edu-
cation loans and borrower margin positions. It is evident that
the bigger the size of the loan limit, the higher is the bor-
rower margin attached to the loan to reduce the credit risk.
The smaller sized loans (less than Rs 400 000 category) are
charged with relatively higher interest rate as most of them
are unsecured where borrower margins are small. These con-
clusions are based on their mean and median values.
Table 3 Course-wise default proportion.
Variable: DDEF (Dummy for defaulted borrowers) N DDEF = 1
[Dummy for defaulted
borrowers] (%)
Mean
Teaching and Training:COURSE_CATD1 226 49.11
Engineering and B Tech:COURSE_CATD2 2044 7.974
Medical:COURSE_CATD3 164 7.927
Graduation:COURSE_CATD4 189 12.17
Management:COURSE_CATD5 552 11.23
Post-Graduate in Univ:COURSE_CATD6 304 18.42
Other Diploma:COURSE_CATD7 67 25.37
Other and Vocational:COURSE_CATD8 318 11.01
Law and CA:COURSE_CATD9 19 0.00
Nursing:COURSE_CATD10 79 17.72
Total 3962 12.47
Table 4 Comparison between solvent and defaulted education loan borrowers.
Variable Solvent group Defaulted group T test for difference
Mean N Mean N
Loan limit in Rs Lac (LOANSIZE) 0.366 4389 0.152 608 0.214***
(13.30)
GENDERD (=1, Male; =0, Female) 0.6685 4330 0.6156 588 0.053***
(2.55)
MARRITALD (=1, Married; =0, Other) 0.1284 4051 0.3621 533 −23.37***
(−14.30)
Borrower age (LNAGE) 3.243 4297 3.435 577 −0.192***
(−13.72)
Repayment months (REPAYMNTH) 108.44 4353 100.07 608 8.36***
(7.52)
Borrower margin (BMARGIN) 0.1901 639 0.1152 41 0.075***
(2.46)
SECURITYD (=1, Secured; =0, not) 0.1173 4339 0.099 607 0.0185*
(1.335)
Note: This table shows the outcome of two-sample un-paired t tests with equal variances
*Signiﬁcant at 5–10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% or better.
***Signiﬁcant at 1% or better.
Units in Rs million, others in numbers.
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We also obtained detailed loss statistics for student loans
(Table 6). The average size of the defaulted loan exposure
is Rs 113 000 with a standard deviation of Rs 128 000. The
average LGD rate of education loans is 62.70% (in terms of
Mean). Loss given default rate estimates the magnitude of
likely loss on the defaulted exposure. There is a signiﬁcant
statistical difference in the loss rate between secured and
unsecured loans. The mean difference t-test results are re-
ported in Table 7. This suggests that the presence of collat-
eral signiﬁcantly reduces the losses due to default in education
loan. The presence of guarantee also reduces the loss rate
due to default (see Table 7 results). Thus, banks can ask for
security and guarantee cover as a safety measure to reduce
their default losses. We also found that LGD varies across col-
lateral categories depending upon their liquidity and mar-
ketability. The average LGD is 25.17% for liquid collaterals
(e.g. Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) policies, Kisan Vikas
Patra (KVP), deposit, bond, etc.) and 20.42% for property.
However, the LGD rate is high if collateral is plant and ma-
chinery (LGD = 62.82%) and personal guarantee (LGD = 78.39%).
Empirical results
The primary objective of our multivariate analysis is to dem-
onstrate the importance of borrower speciﬁc characteris-
tics as well as institutional and regional factors in deterring
the credit risk of education loans in India.
Risk factors in education loan default: multivariate
logit regression results
First, we tested the key factors driving default probability
in education loan. We ran several sets of logistic regres-
Table 5 Relationship between loan size, borrower margin and rate of interest.
Loan limit Margin Interest rate
Size bins N Mean (%) Median (%) SD N Mean (%) Median (%) SD (%)
<400 thousand 452 14.19 5.9 0.179 3720 14.43 13.75 0.397
400–750 thousand 158 38.06 21.52 1.706 723 13.01 13.5 0.0169
750 k–1 million 23 29.96 27.88 0.181 161 13.14 13.3 0.0176
≥1 million 50 36.86 33.58 0.197 365 13.07 13.3 0.018
Note: The sample size difference occurs depending upon the availability of the observations; k = thousand.
Table 6 Loss experiences of defaulted education loan.
Variable N Mean Median SD Min. Max.
LGD
Loss given default
470 0.62696 0.7677 0.3734 0 1
EAD
Defaulted loan exposure
470 0.11301 0.07134 0.12758 0.00103 1.275
Units in Rs million, others in numbers.
Table 7 Loss given default (LGD) difference—due to the presence of security and guarantee.
Variable name Mean Mean
Secured loans
(SECURITYD = 1)
Unsecured loans
(SECURITYD = 0)
t-Test for
difference
Loss given default (LGD) 0.2795 0.6665 −0.387***
(−7.16)
Presence of Guarantee Absence of Guarantee
(DGUAR = 1) (DGUAR = 0)
Loss given default (LGD) 0.527 0.6463 −0.119***
(−2.63)
No. of Accounts (N) 48 422
Note: Two-sample t test with equal variances.
* Signiﬁcant at 5–10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% or better.
***Signiﬁcant at 1% or better.
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sions and compared the results with respect to different sub-
samples provided by the banks. In logistic regression, we
compared the borrowers in the standard category (87.83% of
the sample) with their defaulted counterparts (12.17% of the
total sample). A logit model has the ﬂexibility to incorpo-
rate both the qualitative as well as the quantitative factors
and is more efﬁcient than the linear regression probability
model. The logit regressions predict the probability of an edu-
cation loan default based on a set of borrower speciﬁc factors,
and situational factors (location and regional factors) ob-
tained from the account level credit history of 5000 borrowers.
Two sets of regression results are reported in Table 8 which
gives evidence of major default risk factors in education loan.
The coefﬁcients and t-statistics along with their signiﬁ-
cance level are presented as evidence. Our multivariate lo-
gistic regression results reported in Table 8 provide evidence
of key factors affecting education loan default. We predict
the odd ratio Prob (Default/Solvency) on various qualitative
(gender, borrower location, security, etc.) and quantitative
factors (loan size, age, repayment period, margin, etc.).
We ﬁnd that male borrowers are relatively safer than their
female counterparts. The higher the age of the borrower, the
Table 8 Factors determining education loan default: logistic regression results dependent variable: DDEF is a binary dummy
variable whose value = 1 if a loan is NPA and value = 0 if loan is standard one.
Independent variables Regression set 1
coefﬁcients
Regression set 2
coefﬁcients
Loan limit (LOANSIZE) −0.225**
(−2.15)
Borrower age (LNAGE) 1.699*** 5.747***
(12.91) (5.47)
Customer’s gender (GENDERD) −0.3481*** —
(−3.44)
Repayment months (REPAYMNTH) −0.0203*** —
(−9.93)
Presence of security (SECURITYD) −0.3930** —
(−2.28)
Borrower margin (BMARGIN) — −2.507**
(−2.18)
Rural borrower (BORRLOCD1_R) 1.1988*** —
(7.16)
Sub-urban borrower (BORRLOCD2_SU) −0.3887* —
(−1.88)
Urban borrower (BORRLOCD3_U) 0.5917*** —
(3.72)
Metro borrower (BORRLOCD4_M)@ Dropped —
Central India (INDLOCD1_C) −1.896*** —
(−3.17)
North India (INDLOCD2_N) −1.167*** —
(−6.22)
East India (INDLOCD3_E) −0.8118* —
(−4.08)
North East India (INDLOCD4_NE) −2.66*** —
(−2.63)
West India (INDLOCD5_W) −0.9259*** —
(−4.46)
South India (INDLOCD6_S)$ Dropped 0.871**
(2.50)
Union Territory (INDLOCD7-UT) 1.1415 —
(1.50)
Intercept −5.478*** −20.097***
(−11.18) (−5.95)
No. of observations (N) 4778 663
LR Chi2 (d.f.) 543.12 (13)**** 51.63 (4)***
Pseudo R2# 0.155 0.174
Note: z-statistics are reported in the parentheses.
@ and $: These dummies have been dropped due to collinearity.
#Pseudo-R2 statistic is the McFadden’s-R2.
*Signiﬁcant at 5–10%.
**Signiﬁcant at 5% or better.
***Signiﬁcant at 1% or better.
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higher is the chance of default. In a separate regression, we
found that married borrowers are riskier than unmarried ones.
The likelihood of default is lower if the loan is secured and
the borrower’s own contribution (or borrower margin, denoted
by BMARGIN) for the course is higher. The longer the repay-
ment period, the lower is the chance of default. These results
can be seen in column 2 and column 3 of Table 8 (see the co-
efﬁcients of SECURITYD and REPAYMNTH).
The regression coefﬁcients measure the inﬂuence of these
variables on default risk. Estimated values of the coefﬁ-
cients reported in the second and third columns of Table 8
can be used to describe the probability of a borrower de-
faulting for a unit change in these parameters or a 1% change
in the independent variables. Accordingly, using equation 5
we can estimate exp(β) which measures the effect of the in-
dependent variable on the “odds ratio”. We ﬁnd that the bor-
rowers with security are 1.5 times more likely to remain
solvent than those without security. Similarly, male borrow-
ers are 1.42 times safer than their female counterparts. Simi-
larly, a 10% increase in borrower margin (BMARGIN) decreases
the odds of default by: [exp(−2.507)-1] × 10 = (0.082–
1) × 10 = 9.18%. This measures the economic signiﬁcance of
variable BMARGIN reported in column 3 of Table 8.
Four locational (rural, urban, etc.) and seven regional
(north, east, south, etc.) dummy variables allow the logit
model to estimate the default impact among different loca-
tions. We have found that rural and urban borrowers are sig-
niﬁcantly riskier than the metro and semi-urban borrowers.
This captures the local situational factors on risk of default.
We also tested the effect of regional dummies on likelihood
of default. It emerged that borrowers from south India are
the riskiest. The borrowers from north, central and west region
of India are signiﬁcantly safer in comparison to borrowers
located in the southern part of India.
We also tried to test whether merit and placement records
have statistically signiﬁcant risk reduction effect by intro-
ducing intercept dummies as additional variables in our re-
gressions. Though the coefﬁcient signs are negative, they are
not statistically signiﬁcant. In a separate regression (results
not reported here), we have found that course category ex-
plains defaults. Default chances are higher in B.Ed. and other
teacher training courses, whereas it is signiﬁcantly lower in
Engineering, B Tech. and Medical courses. We also found that
previous education level explains likelihood of default (i.e.,
the higher the education level, the lower is the chance of
default).
Determinants of LGD–Tobit regression results
We also assessed the factors contributing to education loan
default loss rate, which is another important determinant of
credit risk. Loss given default predicts losses as a propor-
tion of the outstanding loan, in the event of a borrower going
into default. It is an estimate of an amount of money, ex-
pressed as a percentage of the exposure amount that cannot
be recovered by bank if a borrower defaults.
Loss given default is a key input in the measurement of
expected and unexpected credit losses and hence of credit
risk regulatory as well as economic capital.
We have run Tobit censored multivariate regression on LGD
which investigates key determinants of credit loss (see equa-
tion 6). Our Tobit regression results reported in Table 9 reveal
some interesting facts. The coefﬁcients reported in the second
column of Table 9 capture the level by which dependent vari-
able LGD will be affected by one unit change in indepen-
dent variable.
We ﬁnd that smaller loans have better recovery and hence
lower LGD percentage. The presence of guarantor/co-
borrower and collateral security increases the chances of loan
recovery and hence reduces LGD rates. The coefﬁcients of
these two variables in LGD regression are statistically sig-
niﬁcant. The longer the repayment period, the lower is the
loss rate (signiﬁcant negative effect on LGD).
We also checked whether the study course duration (in
number of years) had any impact on LGD. We obtained sta-
tistical negative signiﬁcance of this independent variable on
LGD. This means that longer duration courses have lower LGD
(coefﬁcient = −0.1136 with t = −5.95).
Concluding discussion
Using a sample data of 5000 randomly selected borrowers from
four representative public sector banks in India, we studied
the micro level risk of education loan and identiﬁed key risk
factors of such loans across various geographies and consti-
tutions. Our study reveals some interesting facts about edu-
cation loan defaults in India. We ﬁnd that male borrowers are
1.42 times safer than their female counterparts. The higher
the age of the borrower, the higher is the chance of default.
Married borrowers are riskier than unmarried ones. The like-
lihood of default is lower if the loan is secured and the bor-
rower’s own contribution (or borrower margin) is higher.
Borrowers with security are 1.5 times more likely to remain
solvent than those without security. As age of the student in-
creases, so does the likelihood of default (due to increasing
Table 9 Tobit regression explaining factors determining loss
given default (LGD) of education loan (dependent variable:
LGD)
Independent variables Coefﬁcients
Size of loan outstanding at default (LNEAD) 0.05238**
(2.57)
Presence of guarantee (GUARD) −0.1712***
(−3.26)
Presence of collateral security (SECURITYD) −0.4708***
(−6.84)
Repayment months (REPAYMNTH) −0.004***
(−4.46)
Intercept 1.066***
(11.97)
No. of observations (N) 468
LR Chi2 ﬁtness (d.f) 81.66 (4)***
Pseudo R2# 0.119
Note: The dependent variable is left censored to zero (91 left-
censored obs. at LGD ≤0).
#Pseudo-R2 statistic is the McFadden’s-R2.
* Signiﬁcant at 5–10%.
**Signiﬁcant at 5% or better.
***Signiﬁcant at 1% or better.
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ﬁnancial commitments). The likelihood of default is lower if
the loan is secured and the borrower’s own contribution (or
borrower margin) for ﬁnancing the course is higher. The longer
the repayment period, the lower is the chance of default.
These results have important implications on loan appraisal
and credit monitoring by the banks.
Merit and placement records do not have statistically sig-
niﬁcant risk reduction effect. This may be due to the few data
records available in banks. Previous education level ex-
plains likelihood of default (i.e., the higher the education
level, the lower is the chance of default). Course category
types explain borrower likelihood of defaults. Default chances
are higher in B.Ed. and other teacher training courses whereas
default chances are signiﬁcantly lower in Engineering, B.Tech
and Medical courses. Rural and urban borrowers are signiﬁ-
cantly riskier than the metro and semi-urban borrowers. This
captures the local situational factors on risk of default. Default
rates are signiﬁcantly higher in the southern part of India and
lower in northern India.
We have also assessed the factors contributing to educa-
tion loan loss given default, which is another important de-
terminant of credit risk. We found that smaller defaulted
outstanding loans have better recovery and hence lower loss
(LGD) percentage. Thus, the bigger the size of exposure at
default, the higher is the severity of loss rate due to default.
The presence of guarantor/co-borrower and collateral secu-
rity increases the chances of loan recovery and hence reduces
LGD rates. The longer the repayment period, the lower is the
loss rate (signiﬁcant negative effect on LGD). Longer dura-
tion courses have signiﬁcantly lower LGD.
Our study thus suggests that strengthening credit risk as-
sessment techniques, borrower risk assessment through credit
rating, portfolio monitoring, due diligence in lending and in-
stitute performance measures can reduce credit risk in edu-
cation loans. Merit, employability of course, and reputation
of institutions should matter in loan appraisal to reduce the
default risk. Creating awareness among the borrowers/co-
borrowers for repayment of the dues as scheduled and build-
ing a repayment culture among the students is also part of
the social responsibility for banks. Regular tracking of the
student and follow-up may also reduce the risk of default.
Employers should be sensitised regarding payment of equated
monthly instalments (EMI) of education loan of their
employees.
Moreover, by segmenting borrowers by probability of
default and loss given default in a multidimensional scale,
banks can adopt better loss mitigation and pricing strategy
to resolve borrower problems. Borrowers with high probabil-
ity of default and high loss severity can be segmented from
lower credit risk borrowers.
Though the smaller loans are mostly unsecured, for bigger
amounts, banks may ask for securities (in the form of ﬁxed
deposits (FD), LIC policies and property) and co-applicant as
a guarantor to reduce the risk. We recommend that banks use
yearly cohort default rates measures (e.g. transition matrix
or NPA movements) to track the rating slippages to esti-
mate the portfolio credit risk. This is to be done across regions,
course types, institution-wise, and so on, to better under-
stand and monitor portfolio risk. A portfolio approach may
enable a bank to better monitor the risky customers and would
allow for targeted collection efforts to resolve the default.
Banks may prioritise the collection process for high risk ac-
counts earlier in the delinquency cycle. Else, they may opt
for credit guarantee protection from the government/
private agency.
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